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1. Preface  
 
Let me start with one episode. When I met Professor Honma in university 
bookshop, and asked to make a speech in Hungary on some topics related to the 
legal foundation of Japanese high economic growth (in 60’s–70’s), my first reply 
was “Oh well... the shortest answer should be ‘nothing’ ”. 
 What did I mean by that? The point is that Japan is known to be a society 
with very scarce occasions in which law works, in both criminal cases and 
civil litigations. For instance in the United Nations statistics,1 the number of 
homicide per 100,000 population in Japan is only 0.5, while in the United 
States it is 4.6. A part of reason could be of the States and its violent society, 
as often be criticized. However, considering the fact that the same numbers in 
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany lays around 1.5,2 Japan seems to be 
very safe society even in comparison to these countries. On civil disputes, 
Wollschläger shows that there are 1.6 cases in Japan per 1,000 populations per 
a year, while the number is around 20 in France and Germany, over 50 in the 
state of Arizona, U.S. and the United Kingdom,3 From these data, we could say 
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 1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The 7th U.N. Surveys on Crime 
Trends & the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1998–2000), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Seventh-United-Nations-Survey-on-
Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html (visited on 18th 
Feb., 2008). 
 2 The accurate numbers are 1.6, 1.2, and 1.8 for U.K., Germany and France, 
respectively. 
 3 Wollschläger, Ch.: Historical Trends of Civil Litigation in Japan, Arizona, Sweden, 
and Germany: Japanese Legal Culture in the Light of Judicial Statistics. In: Baum, H. 
(ed.): Japan: Economic Success and Legal System, Landsberg, 1997. 
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that there are very scarce legal cases in Japan, and the court has not so much 
importance in Japanese society. The problem is, why this phenomenon exists. 
 
 
Kawashima These: cultural approach 
 
In 1960’s, the main theory on this problem found its answer in cultural factors. 
For instance Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima4 wrote in his famous book 
Japanese Sense of Law,5 that the Japanese dislike to solve disputes by litigation. 
He said that in Japanese traditional sense of law, rights and duties were 
recognized as ambiguous beings, and the people hate to make it clear or definite, 
because it probably harms the harmony in community. He wrote, “Since there 
exists friendly or ‘communal’ relation, to ‘make clear between black and white’ 
destroys the foundation of this friendly ‘communal’ relation”.6 So in Japan “those 
who make civil litigations are branded as ‘weird’ or ‘aggressive’. The attitude 
to avoid litigation is deeply fixed in our hearts”.7 For Kawashima, this feature 
shows the underdevelopment of Japanese society. In the developed countries, 
litigations are thought as “the struggle to rights”, as Rudolf von Jhering said, 
not only just but also sacred means to protect their own rights. Because the 
Japanese still had very weak sense of rights, Kawashima thought, they did not 
want to fight by themselves. So, along with the development of Japan the 
Japanese will recognize their rights stronger, and make litigations more frequent. 
This prediction is often called “the Kawashima These”. 
 
 
“Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou” 
 
There is one clear example often referred in this topic to show that the Japanese 
dislike disputes at all; the idea of Kenka Ryou-Seibai [put same sanction on 
both sides in dispute]. The idea is originally emerged as the Kenka Ryou-
Seibai Hou [The law of Kenka Ryou-Seibai], which originally means that the 
both party in dispute are to equally sanctioned with death penalty. The first 
clear case is thought to be in the law of a Daimyo [feudal lord] in Sengoku Jidai 
  
 4 Takeyoshi Kawashima (1909–1992) was professor of civil law in the University of 
Tokyo. He is famous for introducing legal sociological research into Japan. 
 5 Kawashima, T.: Nihon-jin no Hou-ishiki [Japanese sense of Law], Iwanami Shoten, 
1967. 
 6 Ibid. 140. 
 7 Ibid. 142. 
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[the age of war].8 The Imagawa Kana Mokuroku [Law of House Imagawa]9 
article no. 8 provided “the persons to make violent disputes are both to be 
sentenced to death, without discussing right or wrong”. This kind of rule became 
widespread in the laws of Sengoku feudal loads, and in the age of Tokugawa 
Shogunate (1603–1867) sometimes thought to be “Tenka no Taihou” [the grand 
rule of the country]. At least in the Genroku Akoh case in 1703 (Genroku 15),10 
in which the late subjects of House Asano of Akoh made vengeance to Kira 
Yoshinaka who was believed to committed dispute with Asano Naganori their 
late lord in the Edo Castle, they justified their revenge referring to this law. In 
the dispute only their lord Asano was sentenced to commit Seppuku [the 
forced suicide with honor] while no penalty was put on Kira. 
 
 
Haley’s Argument: systematic approach 
 
Against Kawashima, Professor John O. Haley pointed out the systematic 
problem in Japanese legal sphere. He called the belief that the Japanese dislikes 
litigation was a “Myth”.11 He agreed with Kawashima, that the fact the 
Japanese introduced many arbitration systems before the 2nd World War has 
ended,12 shows that there lies some hesitation to litigate. But he insists that the 
hesitation was of the governing elites, not of the ordinary Japanese. Haley wrote: 
  
 8 Sengoku Jidai (c. 1467–c. 1573) is the age of warfare between two Shogunate, 
Ashikaga and Tokugawa. Along with the decline of power and authority of Ashikaga 
Shogunate, many Daimyo increased their independence from the Shogunate and 
governed their power realm by their own initiative. 
 9 House Imagawa, a branch of Ashikaga Shogunate, was a powerful feudal lord 
governed Suruga and Toutoumi (around Shizuoka prefecture now). Imagawa Kana 
Mokuroku was the law issued by Imagawa Ujichika in 1526 (Daiei 6) independently 
from the Shogunate, to govern his realm. The law was consisted from 33 articles. 
 10 Inside the parenthesis is the name and count of the year in Japanese traditional 
calendar. Since traditional calendar was in lunar system, the year Genroku 15 had some 
difference from 1703 A.D. in its range. 
 11 Haley, J. O.: The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant. Journal of Japanese Study, 4, 
(1978) 359–390. 
 12 E.g. the Land Lease and House Lease Conciliation Act in 1922, Farm Tenancy 
Conciliation Act of 1924, the Commercial Affairs Conciliation Act of 1926, the Labor 
Disputes Conciliation Act of 1926, the Monetary Claims Conciliation Temporary Act of 
1932, the amendment of the Mining Act of 1939, The amendment of the Placer Mines 
Act of 1940, the Agricultural Land Adjustment Act of 1938, the Personal Status 
Conciliation Act of 1939, and the conciliation provisions of the Special Wartime Civil 
Affairs Act of 1942. 
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Kawashima relies heavily on the enactment of these statutes in arguing that 
the Japanese have been loath to litigate. Yet there is nothing to suggest that 
they were the product of popular demand for an alternative to litigation 
more in keeping with Japanese sensitivities. Rather it seems more accurate 
to conclude that they reflected a conservative reaction to the rising tide of 
lawsuits in the 1920s and early 1030s and a concern on the part of the 
governing elite that litigation was destructive to a hierarchical social order 
based upon personal relationships.13 
 
For him, the largest factor for the Japanese to hesitate to litigate was the 
scarcity of lawyers in Japan. There are about 22 thousand practicing attorneys 
in 2006, after much increase from 1990’s, which makes the number of lawyers 
per population of Japan around 1/20 of the United States, and 1/4 even to the 
France. Haley thought that this “institutional incapacity”14 is the main reason, 
and “The failure of Japan to provide more judges and lawyers has been clearly 
a matter of governmental policy”.15 So which is the more reasonable answer to 
the problem … cultural, or systematic? 
 
 
Recent Studies on the Actual Japanese Culture 
 
First of all, I should point out that the Kawashima Thesis is proved to be 
almost false. The statistics of Wollschläger I have mentioned earlier is of 1990, 
i.e. after Japanese high economic growth (1955–1974) and no one would doubt 
that Japan is one of the highly developed countries in the world. There was 
much population movement from rural villages to urban areas in the process of 
the high economic growth, and thus mass-destruction of many customs or rules 
of agriculture-based communities. But still, the number of litigation has not 
increased. 
 Recent comparative study in legal sense also shows that there is not so 
much difference in that point between Japan and the United States.16 According 
  
 13 Haley: op. cit. 373. 
 14 Ibid. 378. 
 15 Ibid. 385. 
 16 Hou-Ishiki Kokusai Hikaku Kenkyuu-kai [The Research Center for International 
Comparison of Legal Consciousness], “Keiyaku Ishiki no Kokusai Hikaku: 22-
kakoku/chiiki Jittai Chousa kara [International Comparison of Contractual Consciousness: 
from the Survey in 22 Countries/Areas]”, Nagoya Daigaku Housei Ronshuu [Nagoya 
University Journal of Law and Politics], 2003. 196. 
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the comparison of surveys in 22 countries/areas in Asia, Europe, Americas, 
Oceania, and Africa, “the countries/areas with relatively high attitude to comply 
contracts are Hong Kong, Israel, and Sweden, while relatively low are Taiwan 
and Brazil”.17 Professor Masanobu Kato, chair to the survey, concluded that in 
the attitude to comply contracts, both the United States and Japan are in very 
mediate level. “We cannot conclude that the difference in the attitude to comply 
contracts is determined by difference between the East and the West”.18 
 From the comparison between the United States, China, and Japan as a part 
of the survey mentioned above, Professor Daniel H. Foote concluded that in all 
these three countries, people thought in general that the alternative conflict 
resolution methods are more favorable than making litigation. He wrote: 
 
There is no clear result which country likes litigation and which dislikes in 
these three countries. (...) There are few people who find the litigation fun 
all around the world, except a few attorneys. In Japan, U.S., China, or 
whatever countries in the world, most people will try to solve the problem 
without making litigations.19 
 
 
How Japanese acted before Kenka Ryou-seibai Hou 
 
Another point what I should emphasize is that recent historical research puts 
new light on the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou. Dr. Katsuyuki Shimizu, a historian 
who investigates the earlier feudal Japanese society, pointed out that the 
Japanese society in 15th century was, against the common image (and also our 
self-image), very violent and aggressive. Among many cases he has introduced 
in his book The Emergence of the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou,20 the following two 
will show typical problem in that age. 
 One is the incident in 1432 (Eikyo 4), in which the monks of two very 
famous temples in Kyoto, i.e. Kinkaku-ji and Kitano Tenmanguu, crushed each 
other in front of Kinkaku and according to one document three monks were 
  
 17 Op. cit.  (“Introduction” by Kato, M.). 
 18 Ibid. 
 19 Foote, D. H.: Saiban to Shakai: Shihou no “Joushiki” Saikou [Litigation and 
Society: Rethinking the “Common Sense” in Judicialy]. Tokyo, 2006. 45. 
 20 Shimizu, K.: Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou no Tanjou [the Emergence of the Kenka 
Ryou-Seibai Hou]. Koudansha, 2006. 
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killed before the Shogun21 himself tried to mediate. Surprisingly, the trigger to 
whole these trouble was that one monk of Kinkaku was laughed at by a boy 
accompanied by the Kitano Monks who visited Kinkaku for sightseeing.22 
Shimizu insists that the people in this period, whether he was Samurai or not, 
had very strong pride and was very sensitive to be abused. 
 Another problem was that under weak government at that era people tend 
to have many connections or lineages to make certain that he could have 
enough help at the time of trouble. For instance, in an incident of 1479 
(Bunmei 11), a brewer in Kyoto killed his wife’s paramour (the secret lover of 
his wife). It was widely admitted to kill him in that kind of affairs at that era, 
so there must not be any problem. But the trouble was, the paramour was a 
Samurai who subjected to the Samurai-Dokoro Tounin [Chief Inspector]23 
Akamatsu Masanori, and the lord tries to assault the brewer for vengeance 
under the name of the investigation of disorderly conduct. Another trouble was 
that the brewer himself had subjected to House Itakura who had subjected to 
another senior statesman of the Shogunate, Shiba Yoshikado.24 Not only the 
members of House Itakura, but of House Kakiya, Ohtagaki, and Enya, other 
families of senior statesmen who had no direct connection with the brewer but 
some kinship with House Itakura, gathered to protect the brewer from 
Akamatsu. Kyoto suddenly faced the danger of war, which could split the whole 
Shogunate into two, from a simple secret love affair of the brewer’s wife.25 
 Shimizu pointed out that in the feudal society in which existed various 
authorities with autonomous power, e.g. the feudal lords, old temples, or the 
group of blind persons who believed to have mysterious power, to discuss 
which parties are right or wrong could not give sufficient answer to finish the 
conflict. Of course the Ashikaga Shogunate at that era tried to make a reasonable 
system of conflict resolution, e.g. mediation by a third-party personnel, sending 
delegation to show apology, or Honnin Seppuku Sei in which the first person 
  
 21 Ashikaga Yoshinori [1394 (Ouei 1)–1441 (Kakitsu 1)], the 6th Shogun of Ashikaga 
Shogunate (1336–1573), reign from 1428 to 1441. He himself was assassinated by one 
feudal load later. 
 22 Shimizu: op. cit. 12–15. 
 23 Samurai-dokoro was one of three important organization of Ashikaga shogunate, 
which governed the military and police affairs. The chief of Samurai-dokoro (“Tounin” 
[Head]) was in rotation of four powerful houses including Akamatsu, the feudal lord 
reigned Harima (part of Hyogo prefecture now). 
 24 House Shiba was a very powerful feudal lord, which reigned many provinces in 
north-western Japan. Shiba Yoshikado was Saki-no Kanrei [late Prime Minister] of the 
shogunate at that time. 
 25 Shimizu: op. cit. 60–62. 
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who actually committed an attack was ordered to commit honorable suicide 
(Seppuku). None of them, however, could gain success until the emergence of 
the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou. 
 
New view: Predictability Approach 
 
In this stage I think we could reach another approach to the scarcity problem: 
the predictability. Professors J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato asserted 
that the Japanese are rational in avoiding litigations.26 Because of some features 
in Japanese litigation process, e.g. the adjudications are made by professional 
judge instead of unpredictable jury, the court session takes much time and it is 
easier for judges to suggest reconciliation between that long process, Ramseyer 
and Nakazato insists that it is very easy to predict the outcome (the adjudication) 
for both parties. Since the litigation needs some costs, i.e. time and money, 
both parties are to avoid it if they could get the same outcome. They wrote, 
“Analysts need not refer to cultural norms to explain how Japanese settle 
disputes over such accidents, for they will find, in fact, the Japanese bargain to 
their immediate advantage ‘in the shadow of the law’”.27 
 The most important feature will be that in Japan the norms and standards 
on which the courts rely in deciding the judgment are open and widely known. 
Typically in the traffic accident cases, “judges use detailed, clear, and public 
formulae to calculate comparative negligence percentages and the victim’s 
damages … whether for death, disability, or simple injury”,28 and these 
formulae are published as a book and open to the public. In the survey over the 
compensations the victims’ family got in traffic accidents with death results, 
“figures suggest that they recover, on average, about 80–110 percent of the 
amount that would earn if they sued and won against a fully insured defendant”.29 
So they concluded that in Japan avoiding the litigation is a result from the 
rational choice of each potential litigant. According to them, “Litigation is scarce 
in Japan not because the system is bankrupt. It is scarce because the system 
works”.30 
 
  
 26 Ramseyer, J. M.–Nakazato, M.: The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and 
Verdict Rates in Japan. Journal of Legal Studies, 18 (1989) 263. 
 27 Ibid. 264. 
 28 Ibid. 269–270. 
 29 Ibid. 280. 
 30 Ibid. 290. 
 ON THE SCARCITY OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN JAPAN 347 
  
The Desire of Whom? 
 
But the trouble still remains, on what purpose established such highly predictable 
system? Professor Takao Tanase pointed out the problem against Haley, and 
asserted that if it had failed to satisfy what the people expect in legal system, 
these must be another reason for it to maintain its existence.31 TANASE insists 
that if the governing elite try to oppress the number of litigation, they should 
give proper alternatives to litigation --- “Clearly, the elite is not omnipotent. If 
the elite is to be effective in leading a society, it cannot depart too radically 
from the aspirations of the people”.32 That is the case in Japan, he concluded. 
 In the case of traffic accident, (1) there are many free consultation service 
run by police, insurance companies, local governments and bar associations, 
(2) there is clear, unified, public standard to calculate the amount of compen-
sation, and (3) there are alternative dispute resolution systems like conciliation 
of the court or the NGO like Koutsuu Jiko Hunsou Shori Sentaa [the Center for 
Conflict Resolution on Traffic Accidents], established in 1974. Since such 
processes absorb most of all conflicts, Tanase wrote, it became somewhat rare 
occasion for both parties to decide to bring the conflict to court. He called his 
theory as the management model. 
 If the differential weighting is so arranged as to make the disputants “find” 
judicial services less efficient and alternative services more satisfactory, then 
the state, without any coercion, can effectively induce the people to voluntarily 
use fewer services. (…) The people now believe that the system is created only 
to benefit them, not contrived by an ill-willed agant with a hidden agenda.33 
 Still there remains a problem: who are those elites? Haley insists that the 
governing elite dislike litigation because it will break the friendly, communal 
relationship on which their power relied. It could be an explanation why the 
Japanese government is very eager to keep the quality of bills and acts, and to 
maintain the unification of the whole legal system, through the strict audit 
process of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. They tried to avoid litigations by 
making clear and highly predictable statutes. But what about judges? What are 
their incentives to avoid litigations? Wouldn’t be the litigations their source of 
power? 
 
 
  
 31 Tanase, T.: The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in 
Japan. Law and Society Review, 24 (1990) 651–692. 
 32 Ibid. 656. 
 33 Ibid. 656–657. 
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The Role of Courts: to avoid them to work? 
 
Foote describes the curious situation concerning this matter.34 It is the judges 
themselves that established the highly predictable rules and standards about 
traffic accident compensations from which everyone could avoid litigation. He 
introduces the fact that in corresponding to the rapid increase of traffic 
accident, and thus increase of lawsuit filed to the court in early 1960’s, the 
Supreme Court of Japan decided to establish the special division to solve them, 
i.e. the 27th civil division in the Tokyo District Court in 1962. Just after its 
establishment the judges in the division started eagerly to make new, highly 
predictable system to solve the problem: they persuaded the prosecutors’ office 
to offer police inspection report on the accidents, organized workshops to 
investigate the substantive and procedural law relating this topic, and made the 
standard formulae for the attorneys to file a lawsuit and for the judges to 
adjudicate. In fact it was those judges that made the whole “detailed, clear, and 
public formulae to calculate comparative negligence percentages and the 
victim’s damages”,35 which Ramseyer and Nakazato introduces. It is also 
notable that not only judges but also public prosecutors (referred above) and 
attorneys were cooperative in the process. If they didn’t agree with the judges 
to bring high predictability to the courts and thus decrease its role, it would be 
totally useless to making standard formulae of petitions. 
 So there came to be another problem. Not only bureaucrats, but judges, 
prosecutors, and attorneys were eager to suppress the number of litigation 
through establishing high predictability in the whole legal process. But it is 
certain that this is not totally for their profit, especially in the case of attorneys 
who could earn from making litigations. Who wants these features in Japan? 
 
 
Yet Another New Approach: the interaction of culture and system 
 
I suppose that there is only the people themselves are left. According to 
Tanase, there must be some reason if the system, which fails to satisfy the 
peoples’ expectation, continued its existence. But what about the case if a 
system successfully satisfies what the people expect for the legal system at 
least to some extent? You may notice that the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou is also 
very predictable, especially with very law resource to investigate the cases: 
both parties are to be sentenced to death without discussing right or wrong. 
  
 34 Foote: op. cit. 
 35 Ramseyer–Nakazato: op. cit.  269–270. 
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Shimizu pointed out that the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou had established in the 
process of Ashikaga Shogunate to lose its political power, and its validity 
under Tokugawa Shogunate was limited only to wartime,36 although the late 
subjects of House Asano insisted that the law was “the grand rule of the 
country”. 
 Thus, in my opinion, it could understand as a compromising rule to stop 
conflicts to escalate with limited resources, at least from the viewpoint of the 
governing elites. We could notice that the last thing left in there was the claim 
for predictability and equality, i.e. very simple rule which could be called as 
“the balance sheet of blood”, which is rumored to be still used in the under-
ground world of Japanese mafia (Yakuza) to resolute the conflict. 
 They were the Japanese ordinary citizens who appraised on the vengeance 
of the late members of House Asano in the Genroku Akoh case. The case was 
later dramatized in the Kabuki “Chuushin-gura”, the most famous and popular 
program in Japanese traditional play. Since the members’ claim to gain balance 
of blood between two Houses conflicted with the Shogunate’s policy to regain 
peace within the society after long wartime of the Sengoku Jidai, all the 
members were sentenced to death. The only sign of concession from the 
Shogunate was that they were permitted to commit Seppuku instead of were 
beheaded, which usually applied to murder from personal fight. Their corpses 
were buried in Sengaku-ji temple of Edo, the same place as their late lord, where 
still the incense to pray for their souls never cease. Of course those incense 
were dedicated by the ordinary man-on-the-streets through the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, the Japanese Empire after the Meiji restoration, and post-war 
liberal democracy. 
 If we could find the cultural character special to Japanese, in my view it 
could be very strong concern with equality, unity, and thus predictability, 
shown in the emerging process of the Kenka Ryou-Seibai Hou. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let me summarize the point. Against Kawashima who thought that the scarcity 
of litigation was the direct expression of Japanese weak sense of rights, Haley 
pointed out that there could be some systematic problem behind the scene. 
Ramseyer and Nakazato, joined to Haley, asserted that under the existence of 
more effective alternative conflict resolution systems it is rather rational for 
the people to depend upon them. I would like to point out in addition, that it 
  
 36 Shimizu: op. cit. 191. 
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should be better to start our inquiry from why the conflicts would occur. As 
Immanuel Kant suggests, if all the person could use his practical reason 
properly, everyone will come to know what is his due portion of goods, and 
thus there should be no conflict between persons.37 I don’t intend to say that 
the Japanese have such an ideal character, but it suggests also that if each of us 
know exactly what the law will provide, there would be no conflict, and there 
is rather strong law functioning in reality, than weak sense of law. Of course to 
what extent this hypothesis could explain the fact of the scarcity of litigation in 
Japan needs more detailed study, I would like to propose a little bit new 
framework to see the legal function in society, other than just a number of 
litigation brought into courts. 
 
 
 
  
 37 Kant, I.: Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Berlin, 1907.  
